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Graham’s Good News—and Not

Richard
S. Frase
Benjamin N. Berger
Professor of
Criminal Law,
University of
Minnesota
Law School

In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court struck down a
severe prison sentence under the Eighth Amendment—
something it has only done once before, in Solem v. Helm,
back in 1983.1 Moreover, the language and approach of
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion carries the potential for
further expansion and clarification of Eighth Amendment
protections. That’s good news for those of us who view
post-1983 decisions upholding severe prison sentences as
an abdication of the Court’s constitutional responsibility
to protect politically powerless criminal defendants from
excessive penalties.2 At a minimum, Kennedy’s opinion
suggests a more unified approach to proportionality
review, in place of the Court’s previous two-track distinction between death and prison sentences.3
The bad news is that the Court’s decision could wind
up being a very narrow precedent—the proverbial ticket
good for this day and this train only—and one that doesn’t
actually shorten many prison terms. The further bad news
is that the majority in Graham may have managed to make
Eighth Amendment law even less clear than it was before
(the Court itself has noted that “our precedents in this
area . . . have not established a clear or consistent path for
courts to follow”4). Justice Kennedy purports to recognize
two types of Eighth Amendment precedent: categorical bans
(previously applied only in death-penalty cases) and casespecific assessments (previously the only type of analysis
applied to lengthy prison sentences). He then applies the
death penalty approach to Graham’s prison sentence. But
these two approaches are not as distinct as the Court seems
to think; lower courts will now have to decide which one to
use, and whether the choice really makes much difference.
Moreover, the majority opinion and Justice Roberts’s
concurrence continued to apply a standard of “gross
disproportionality” without saying what that means—disproportionate relative to what?5 In particular, is retributive
disproportionality ever a sufficient basis to invalidate a
prison sentence, or even a death sentence? If not—if
unconstitutionally severe prison sentences must also be
grossly disproportionate relative to all applicable nonretributive sentencing purposes (mainly deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation)—how is such nonretributive proportionality defined? The Court’s silence
on these matters gives lower courts very little guidance,

and will result in either widely conflicting applications of
Graham or (more likely) a refusal to take the Court’s decision seriously and give it any further application beyond
its specific facts.
I. The Good News

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion suggests that at least
five justices are now willing to adopt meaningful Eighth
Amendment limits on severe prison sentences, and to do
so under categoric prohibitions such as those previously
applied only to death sentences. Kennedy’s opinion also sheds
further light on what factors enter into a finding of Eighth
Amendment disproportionality. (Justice Roberts rejects
the majority’s categoric rule, and his case-specific analysis
may limit his condemnation of juvenile life without parole
(LWOP) to the particular, rather extreme facts of Graham,6
but his concurrence at least shows some willingness to
use the Solem standards to limit extreme prison sentences
under the Eighth Amendment, as well as a rejection of the
hands-off approach of Justices Scalia and Thomas.)
A. Death Isn’t So Different

The Court’s prior case law, invalidating many more death
sentences than prison terms and often (but not always)
applying categoric, bright-line prohibitions, suggested that
for Eighth Amendment purposes, “death is different.”7
The majority opinion in Graham seems to partially erase
that distinction, and to permit more generous Eighth
Amendment review of severe prison sentences—at least
if enough other things about the case are different. In prior
cases, the Court had held that juvenile offenders are different from adults, and thus can never receive the death
penalty.8 The Court had also held that nonhomicide crimes
are different (i.e., death is different on the offense side), so
such offenders can never receive the death penalty.9 What
the majority arguably held in Graham is that the latter two
“differents” (juvenile offender, nonhomicide crime) outweigh the first, and allow more generous Eighth Amendment
scrutiny even for a nondeath sentence.
B. Disproportionality Relative to What

In discussing why juveniles and nonhomicide crimes are
different, the majority opinion gives strong emphasis to
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the two sentencing factors normally associated with retributive punishment philosophy, the offender’s personal
culpability10 and the seriousness of the harm caused or
threatened by the offense.11 Although the Court also discusses whether Graham’s crime could be justified to
achieve nonretributive sentencing purposes, its emphasis
on culpability and harm suggests that in a future case
retributive disproportionality might, by itself, be a basis
for finding a prison sentence to be in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.12
Such a purely retributive cap on punishment severity
has been advocated by a number of scholars,13 and was
apparently adopted in at least one of the Court’s death
penalty cases. In Coker v. Georgia,14 the Court stated that a
death sentence is excessive and unconstitutional if either
of two conditions is met: (a) the sentence “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering” or (b) the sentence
is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”
The second condition seemed to imply a retributive standard, because proportionality has been most commonly
associated with that punishment theory;15 moreover, the
Court invalidated Coker’s sentence entirely on that
ground—that is, on the basis of the lesser harm of his
nonhomicide offense—ignoring case facts that might have
supported a death sentence to deter other violent offenders.16 Subsequent cases barring use of the death penalty
have been based on both prongs of the Coker standard, but
the Court’s most recent case, Kennedy v. Louisiana, extends
Coker and quotes the Coker standards, including the language that each prong is independent.17
As noted, the majority in Graham also discusses the
other Coker prong—whether the punishment serves legitimate penological goals other than retribution. But the
good news here is that, in rejecting these sentencing purposes as sufficient justifications for Graham’s LWOP
sentence, Justice Kennedy’s opinion may shed some light
on a question the Court has studiously ignored in previous
decisions: What makes a sentence grossly disproportionate relative to these nonretributive purposes? In previous
writings,18 I have proposed two nonretributive proportionality principles and have shown how they have been
applied in a wide variety of constitutional contexts.
The first principle, what I call ends-benefits proportionality, requires that the costs and burdens of
punishment should not exceed the likely benefits to be
achieved; furthermore, the added costs and burdens of a
more severe penalty compared with a lesser one should
not exceed the likely added benefits. The second principle,
alternative-means proportionality (referred to by some
writers as the principle of parsimony or necessity, and
akin to constitutional requirements of narrow tailoring),
posits that, because punishment is itself an evil (it is
harmful to offenders, and costly), a penalty should be the
least severe measure that will suffice under the circumstances—in other words, if a less severe punishment will

achieve essentially the same benefits, the more severe penalty is excessive.
Each of these two utilitarian proportionality principles
finds some support in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Endsbenefits proportionality is implicit in his rejection of
deterrence as a sufficient rationale for Graham’s LWOP
sentence; Justice Kennedy argues that the same factors of
immaturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and
susceptibility to peer pressure that make juveniles less
morally culpable also make them less deterable; thus, “any
limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole [or
any added effect compared to life with parole?] is not
enough to justify the sentence.”19
The other utilitarian principle, alternate-means proportionality, is implicit in Justice Kennedy’s rejection of
incapacitation and rehabilitation as justifications for Graham’s sentence. Because juveniles have a greater capacity
for change than adults, a sentencing court cannot know
whether, at some time before he dies, this particular juvenile will become much less dangerous due to maturation,
religious conversion, and/or rehabilitation. An LWOP
sentence represents an irrevocable judgment of permanent incorrigibility, and is thus constitutionally excessive
because it may prove unnecessarily severe.20 One important broader implication of this argument is that mandatory
minimum sentences likewise cannot be justified on incapacitation grounds—inevitably, some of the offenders who
fall within the scope of the mandatory minimum will be,
or become, insufficiently dangerous to justify the fixed
minimum term.21
II. The Bad News

Despite the hopeful signs highlighted previously, there is
reason to doubt that Graham will have many, or even any,
of these broader and beneficial effects. Moreover, the justices have once again missed an opportunity to more
clearly define Eighth Amendment standards; indeed, Justice Kennedy’s opinion may have made those standards
even more opaque.
A.

Kennedy’s Majority Opinion—Less Than Meets
the Eye?

The scope of Justice Kennedy’s opinion is potentially very
narrow (and Justice Roberts’s opinion is even narrower).
The factors that encouraged Justice Kennedy to overcome
the death-is-different barrier are, themselves, fairly unique
and different from most other cases challenging a prison
term on Eighth Amendment grounds—Graham was a
juvenile offender, receiving an LWOP sentence, for a nonhomicide crime. The majority stressed all three of these
differences. In lieu of the death-is-different distinction,
Justice Kennedy seemingly drew a new dividing line, citing Solem v. Helm for the proposition that, among prison
sentences, LWOP is qualitatively different from life with
parole, especially for a juvenile.22 In a future prisonsentence case, if any of these three factors is lacking, the
Court can easily say—“Graham was different.”
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Moreover, the actual holding of Kennedy’s opinion
does not necessarily prevent this or other defendants from
spending the rest of their lives in prison. The opinion
emphasizes that it does not guarantee a right to actual
release, only a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”23 So
despite the extended discussion by Justice Kennedy (and
Justice Roberts) of the diminished culpability of juvenile
nonhomicide offenders, it appears that they can end up
serving life without parole unless, at some point, crimecontrol purposes justify release—their diminished
culpability and other retributive values based on the original offense impose no upper limit on prison time served.
B. Eighth Amendment Standards May Have Become
Even More Unclear

Justice Kennedy’s extension of death penalty standards to
some prison sentences raises many new problems. Moreover, it remains unclear how the underlying standard of
gross disproportionality is defined, especially in relation
to nonretributive punishment purposes such as deterrence and incapacitation.
1.

Death Penalty Standards Versus Solem Standards

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion applies standards previously used only in death penalty cases, rather than the
standards of Solem v. Helm, as modified in the Harmelin
and Ewing plurality opinions. But when are courts required
to use the majority’s approach, and how much does this
approach actually differ in substance and likely results
from the Solem standards?
Justice Kennedy initially seems to choose the categoric,
death penalty approach because that’s what Graham’s
counsel asked the Court to do.24 But as Justice Roberts
points out, Graham also asked, in the alternative, for a ruling using the Solem standards, and surely the majority
could have chosen that approach if it wanted to. (Moreover, not all of the death penalty cases cited by the majority
were fully categoric; Enmund v. Florida25 was arguably
based on the specific facts of the defendant’s limited
accomplice role and intent.) However, there were good
reasons to adopt a broader, categoric rule in a case like
Graham. Justice Kennedy noted one of those reasons later
in his opinion: Any case involving a juvenile offender
raises greater risks of unwise defendant litigation choices
and poor communication with counsel, leading to overall
defense ineffectiveness and an unacceptable risk that
some of these offenders will receive an unconstitutionally
severe sentence.26
Other familiar arguments in favor of a broad, brightline ruling are that it gives lower courts more guidance
and protects reviewing courts from a flood of new sentencing appeals. It also lessens gross sentencing disparities.
Under a case-specific ruling (or the hands-off approach of
the dissent), juvenile nonhomicide LWOP sentences
would remain very rare in practice; such highly selective
severity would make the penalty as capricious, wanton,
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and freakish as some death penalties the Court has
invalidated.27
Still, how will lower courts know whether and when
to use the categoric approach, in cases seeking to extend
Graham? And beyond the difference between categoric
and case-specific rulings, how much do the death penalty
and Solem-Harmelin-Ewing standards differ? The latter
requires the reviewing court to first find an inference of
gross disproportionality (based on a threshold comparison of the defendant’s sentence with his crimes—Solem,
step one), before the court may engage in intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons (steps two and three), whereas
the categoric death penalty approach seems to proceed
in the opposite order: The Court first conducts an interjurisdictional comparison (Solem, step three), looking
for evidence of a national consensus against the type of
sentence at issue. The Court then essentially conducts
a Solem step-one analysis, making its own independent
disproportionality assessment by comparing the severity
of the penalty with the defendant’s culpability and the
harmfulness of the offense, in light of precedent and
the Eighth Amendment’s “text, history, meaning, and
purpose.”28
Thus, the main effect of using the national-consensusplus-independent-judgment approach is to guarantee
interjurisdictional comparisons in every case by eliminating
the Solem-Harmelin-Ewing step-one threshold requirement
(while also eliminating Solem step two—intrajurisdictional
comparisons). But are lower courts bound to take this
approach? Or can a court that wants to uphold a severe
prison sentence simply choose to rule on a case-specific
basis and apply the much stricter Solem-Harmelin-Ewing
standards?
2. Utilitarian Disproportionality Standards As noted
previously, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion implies that
a sentence based on nonretributive (crime-control) punishment purposes can also be grossly disproportionate. But
neither his opinion nor the Roberts concurrence defines
any standards of utilitarian proportionality, although at least
two such principles may underlie Kennedy’s rejection of
crime-control justifications for Graham’s LWOP sentence.
Kennedy also says very little about how the applicable
proportionality standards relate to each other, but he implies
that they are not independent, and that a sentence must be
grossly disproportionate to all applicable purposes—“A
sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is
by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”29 As I have
argued in previous writings, each of the three proportionality principles (one retributive and two nonretributive)
reflects distinct and important values, so a violation of any
one of them should suffice to make a sentence unconstitutionally excessive.30
At a minimum, the Court should have made explicit
what is only implicit in Graham: that the two nonretributive proportionality principles are independent of each
other, so that a violation of either principle can invalidate
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a proposed nonretributive punishment rationale. Finally,
the Court should avoid using imprecise language that confuses very different sentencing purposes—for example,
when it says that, for reasons of incapacitation, Graham
“deserved” some period of incarceration, and that he
might eventually prove so irredeemable and permanently
dangerous as to “deserve” LWOP.31 Deserved punishment
is the language of retribution, not incapacitation.
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III. Conclusion

Graham is both good news and bad news for those seeking
meaningful and clear Eighth Amendment limits on excessive prison sentences. Juvenile nonhomicide offenders
will certainly benefit from taking LWOP off the table, but
it remains to be seen how many of those offenders will
actually serve less than their full lives in prison. Moreover,
in cases not governed by the majority’s categoric rule (e.g.,
a juvenile nonhomicide offender with a fifty-year minimum
sentence), will the Court and lower courts expand Graham
and its novel, death-isn’t-so-different approach? Alternatively, will they limit Graham to its facts—or go in multiple,
inconsistent directions? Doctrinally, will the Court more
clearly define its standards of retributive and nonretributive
proportionality, building on the implicit standards applied
in Graham? Or, will it continue to speak loosely, and confusingly, about proportionality and deserved punishment?
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